

Dep't of Parks and Recreation v. Dunnell

OATH Index No. 1140/26 (June 12, 2026), *adopted*, Comm'r Dec. (June 29, 2026), **appended**

Petitioner proved that respondent sexually harassed a coworker.
ALJ recommends that respondent serve a 60-day suspension
without pay.

**New York City Office of
Administrative Trials and Hearings**

In the Matter of
Department of Parks and Recreation
Petitioner
-against-
Leroy Dunnell
Respondent

Report and Recommendation

Christine Stecura, *Administrative Law Judge*

Table of Contents

Background	- 3 -
Analysis	- 3 -
Petitioner's Evidence.....	- 4 -
Respondent's Evidence	- 7 -
Sexual Harassment.....	- 8 -
Findings and Conclusions.....	- 11 -
Recommendation.....	- 11 -

Background

Petitioner, the Department of Parks and Recreation (the “Department”), brought this disciplinary proceeding against respondent, Leroy Dunnell, under section 75 of the Civil Service Law. Petitioner alleged that, on July 5, 2025, respondent, a Park Supervisor, sexually harassed a coworker while on duty at the Upper Highland Park house (Pet.). Specifically, while the complainant was eating lunch, respondent rubbed the complainant’s shoulder and leg and asked to touch her breasts (*Id.*).

Through his actions, petitioner contends that respondent violated Chapter 3, Rule I(8) of the Department’s Standards of Conduct (“Standards of Conduct”), which provides that sexual harassment is a form of misconduct (Pet.; ALJ Ex. 1). Petitioner further contends that respondent violated Chapter Three, Rule III(6)(A) of the Standards of Conduct, which states that “[e]ngaging in activity that interferes with any activity of the [Department] or those of its officers or employees” is “conduct unbecoming a City employee” and “[p]rejudicial to [g]ood [o]rder and [d]iscipline” (Pet.; ALJ Ex. 1). Respondent denied the allegations and requested that the charges be dismissed.

A one-day trial was held before me on May 13, 2026. The proceedings were held remotely by videoconference. Petitioner relied upon the testimony of three witnesses and documentary evidence. Respondent testified on his own behalf. For the reasons set forth below, I find that petitioner proved the charges and recommend that respondent serve a 60-day suspension without pay.

Analysis

Petitioner has the burden of proving the charges by a preponderance of the credible evidence. *See Dep’t of Correction v. Hall*, OATH Index No. 400/08 at 2 (Oct. 18, 2007), *adopted*, Comm’r Dec. (Nov. 5, 2007), *aff’d*, NYC Civ. Serv. Comm’n Item No. CD-08-33-SA (May 30, 2008). Preponderance has been defined as “the burden of persuading the triers of fact that the existence of the fact is more probable than its non-existence.” *Prince, Richardson on Evidence* § 3-206 (Lexis 2008). “If the evidence is equally balanced, or if it leaves the [trier of fact] in such doubt as to be unable to decide the controversy either way, judgment must be given against the

party upon whom the burden of proof rests.” *Id.*; see also *Rinaldi & Sons, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Alarm Service, Inc.*, 39 N.Y.2d 191, 196 (1976).

The resolution of the charges rests on a determination of the credibility of the witnesses. In assessing credibility, this tribunal has considered “witness demeanor, consistency of a witness’ testimony, supporting or corroborating evidence, witness motivation, bias or prejudice, and the degree to which a witness’ testimony comports with common sense and human experience.” *Dep’t of Sanitation v. Menzies*, OATH Index No. 678/98 at 2 (Feb. 5, 1998), *aff’d*, NYC Civ. Serv. Comm’n Item No. CD-98-101-A (Sept. 9, 1998).

Petitioner’s Evidence

Petitioner relied upon the testimony of the complainant, respondent’s supervisor, Regis Garcia, and a Department investigator, Daniel Dajani, as well as incident reports and an investigation report.

The complainant has worked 19 years with the Department as a seasonal and permanent employee (Tr. 9). Her permanent civil service title is Associate Park Service Worker, but during the summer season she “steps up” to a Level 1 Supervisor, which was her title at the time of the incident (Tr. 9-10). Prior to May 2025, the complainant had never worked with or had a conversation with respondent, but she had seen him before (Tr. 11). She described the nature of their relationship as coworkers (*Id.*).

On July 5, 2025, the complainant was working a 7:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. shift at Lower and Upper Highland Park (Tr. 10-11). She walked into the office with her food and sat down at a circle table with a printer and started eating (Tr. 12). Respondent was sitting at a desk with a computer in the same room. He moved his chair over to her and started rubbing her left arm. She asked him, “What happened? What are you doing?,” and moved her chair away. He started to rub her left leg. She got up and asked, “What’s going on? Like, are you all right? What the fuck . . . are you doing? Like, chill out.” He then said, “Let me touch those big things.” She asked him, “What’s wrong? Like, you okay? Stop talking to me like that,” and she walked seven or eight feet away to the air conditioner near the office door (Tr. 12-13). He said again, “Let me touch those big things” (Tr. 12). No one else was in the room when this occurred (Tr. 15).

The complainant asked respondent to call their coworker Joshua, telling respondent, “You know, he don’t answer my phone” (Tr. 12). Respondent called Joshua, who at first could not hear the complainant because she did not want to stand closer to respondent. She then “scream[ed] from the air conditioner to where [respondent was]” and asked him to pick her up. Eventually, Joshua came in a small, motorized vehicle called a “gator,” and the complainant left with him (Tr. 12). She did not tell Joshua what had happened (Tr. 15). The complainant dropped Joshua off and then was stopped by a patron (Tr. 12-13). After speaking to the patron, she drove the gator for a bit longer and then called her sister, who told her to call the police (Tr. 13). The complainant told her sister that she cannot call the police “because that’s not the way the Parks department works.” (*Id.*). After speaking with her sister, the complainant called her supervisor, Garcia, and told him what happened. He told her to go home, and she left before her shift ended (Tr. 13-14, 16). She received a call later that day from her “supervision,” who asked her if she was willing to return to work (Tr. 13). She told her supervision that “of course, [she] want[ed] to come back to the district. [She] didn’t do anything wrong” (*Id.*). Her “supervision” told her that respondent would be moved to another location, and when she returned to work the next day, respondent was not there (*Id.*).

The complainant stated that the experience made her feel uncomfortable, uneasy, disbelief, shocked, and scared (Tr. 14). She explained that she was scared for her job because at the time of the incident, she was a seasonal employee while respondent was permanent (*Id.*). She found the incident to be “unbelievable and scary,” and she could not believe that it was happening “from [her] coworker and a supervisor” (*Id.*).

The complainant submitted an incident report dated July 8, 2025, that states:

On 7/5/25 I was eating my lunch sitting at the desk that ha[s] the printer on it when [respondent] slid his chair next to me and start[ed] [to] rub up my left arm . . . [I] said [to respondent] what[‘s] happen[ing,] stop what[‘]s wrong with you . . . [I] moved my chair over closer to the office and [he] slid his chair closer to me and started rubbing my leg . . . [I] got a little louder and stood up[,] saying [respondent] stop[,] what the fuck are you doing . . . [H]e said let me touch [those] big things . . . [I] said what, stop talking to me like that and he said[,] come on[,] let me touch them

big things sitting on your chest[.] [I] then walked in[.]front of the air conditioner and said[,] can you please call Joshua so he can bring me the gator[,] [you] know he [does not] answer my call[s] . . . [H]e then pulled out his phone and dialed the number and [J]oshua answered and he told [J]oshua [I] [want to] talk to him[.] [I] started talking to [J]oshua but he was saying he could[n't] hear me because I was far away because I did[n't] want to get close to [respondent]. Joshua then came and [I] took the gator and dropped him back off. I had a conversation with . . . a patron and then I called my sister and told her what happen[ed] and she advised me to [call] the police but I called my [Parks Supervisor 2] Garcia Regis and told him what had happened[.]

(Pet. Ex. 1). Petitioner did not elicit any testimony regarding the complainant's incident report at trial (*Id.*).

Garcia has worked for the Department for 13 years and is currently an Administrative Parks and Recreation Manager, but in the summer of 2025, his title was Park Supervisor Level 2 (Tr. 18-19). On July 5, 2025, he was supervising the complainant, a seasonal supervisor, and respondent, a permanent supervisor (Tr. 19-20). He had worked with respondent for about a year and with the complainant since May 2025 (Tr. 20). He described the complainant as his subordinate and respondent as his peer (*Id.*).

Garcia recalled that the complainant contacted him around 3:00 p.m. Initially, she did not want to tell him what had happened, but she sounded "kind of distraught" (Tr. 20). He explained that her voice was cracking and that "she was just not sounding right" (Tr. 21). When she was able to tell him what happened, "[he] could hear over the phone that . . . it was just a struggle to say what [had] happened" (*Id.*). Garcia summarized the incident as "a situation at Highland Park . . . where . . . [respondent] made a gesture or asked to . . . touch [complainant] . . . [A]nd she was not too comfortable with that request" (*Id.*).

After speaking with the complainant, Garcia contacted his superiors, Labor Relations, and the Advocate's Office and completed an incident report the same day (Tr. 21; Pet. Ex. 2). The incident report, dated July 5, 2025, states in pertinent part:

As reported by [Park Supervisor Level 1] [complainant], while eating lunch [Park Supervisor Level 1] [respondent] rubbed her

legs and arm making [complainant] uncomfortable. [Respondent] then asked if he could touch her breast, which she rejected. [Complainant] asked [respondent] to call [City Park Worker] Joshua . . . to pick her up with the gator, as she no longer felt comfortable around [respondent]. [Complainant] attempted to avoid any other interaction with [respondent] and brought this to [Garcia's] attention towards the end of [the] day at approximately 3 [p.m.] [Complainant] was audibly shaken from this interaction with [respondent] during [their] phone call.

(Pet. Ex. 2).

Dajani has worked with the Department for 10 years and is currently the Chief Investigator for the Department's Office of Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Belonging ("DEIB") (Tr. 23-24). He explained that DEIB defines sexual harassment as "verbal or physical harassment of a sexual nature," which includes "unwanted advances, requests for sexual favors . . . conversations of a sexual nature, unwanted touching of an individual's body, or offhanded comments with sexual connotations" (Tr. 24). He stated that this definition was based on the citywide policy (*Id.*).

Dajani testified that he spoke to the complainant the day after DEIB received a complaint from supervision on July 5, 2025 regarding the allegations against respondent (Tr. 25). Approximately 20 days after the alleged incident, he also spoke to respondent, who denied the claims (Tr. 26-27). Dajani testified that he found it remarkable that respondent did not recall during the interview that the complainant requested that someone pick her up from the location, which Dajani found implausible because it was a "novel occurrence" and should have stood out (*Id.*).

Dajani completed the DEIB investigation report on July 25, 2025, substantiating the complainant's claim of sexual harassment (Tr. 25; Pet. Ex. 3). The Commissioner issued its report adopting DEIB's findings on August 18, 2025, after which the report was sent to the Department's Advocate Office on August 20, 2025 (Tr. 25-26).

Respondent's Evidence

Respondent testified on his own behalf. He has been employed by the Department since April 2007 (Tr. 30). As Park Supervisor Level 1, he is responsible for supervising employees and

volunteers, inspecting parks, and writing performance evaluations for those under his supervision (Tr. 30-31). Respondent is currently assigned to District 7, but at the time of the alleged incident, he was assigned to District 5A under the supervision of Garcia (*Id.*). In July 2025, he worked the second shift, and his hours could be from 10:00 a.m. to 7:30 p.m. or from 12:00 or 1:00 p.m. to 9:30 p.m. (Tr. 31). Prior to working with the complainant in District 5A, where Highland Park is located, beginning in May 2025, he had only seen the complainant occasionally (Tr. 31-32).

On July 5, 2025, respondent began working at Upper Highland Park sometime between 12:00 and 12:30 p.m., and his team arrived between 12:30 and 1:00 p.m. (Tr. 32). Respondent did not specifically recall seeing the complainant that day. Nor did he recall seeing her leave for the day but said that she would have to sign out before leaving, which he did not see her do (Tr. 35). He remembered that both he and the complainant were on duty, that it was busy, and he went out into the field as soon as his team arrived (*Id.*). Respondent denied rubbing the complainant's shoulder or leg on the date of the alleged incident (Tr. 32-33). He also denied that he told her that he wanted to touch her breasts (Tr. 33). He further denied ever touching or making sexual gestures toward the complainant (Tr. 34). Respondent stated that the complainant never asked him to call another employee to pick her up and reasoned that the complainant had her own phone and it did not make sense for her to ask him to call (Tr. 33-34).

At approximately 5:00 or 6:00 p.m., Garcia came to the location and moved respondent to another location, but he did not know why he was moved. He eventually learned that he was being investigated (Tr. 36). Respondent did not know why the complainant would allege that he sexually harassed her (Tr. 34). He spoke to Dajani during DEIB's investigation and denied the allegations (Tr. 33).

Sexual Harassment

Petitioner contends that respondent violated the Standards of Conduct by engaging in sexual harassment, as defined by the City's Equal Employment Opportunity Policy ("EEO Policy") and the Standards of Conduct (Tr. 38; Pet.; ALJ Exs. 1, 2). Respondent, as a city employee, is bound by the EEO Policy's prohibition of sexual harassment, which is "a form of gender/sex discrimination" (ALJ Ex. 2 at 34). The policy makes clear that "[h]arassers can be a supervisor, a

subordinate, a coworker, or anyone in the workplace . . .” (*Id.*). “Hostile work environment sexual harassment is conduct that is directed at an individual because of their sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender expression and has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, offensive, or abusive work environment” (*Id.*). Examples of hostile work environment sexual harassment include “[u]nwanted verbal or physical advances, sexually explicit derogatory statements, or sexually discriminatory remarks that are offensive or objectionable to the recipient and that cause the recipient discomfort or humiliation, and/or interfere with the recipient’s job performance” (*Id.*). Other examples include “[s]exually oriented words, gestures, noises, remarks, jokes, pranks, or comments,” as well as “[p]hysical acts of a sexual nature, such as touching, pinching, patting, grabbing, kissing, hugging, brushing against, or poking another” (*Id.* at 35).

The Standards of Conduct define sexual harassment in part as “[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when . . . such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment” (ALJ Ex. 1 at 2-3).

Petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that respondent engaged in sexual harassment and created a hostile work environment, thereby violating the prohibitions against sexual harassment in the EEO Policy and the Standards of Conduct. The complainant gave compelling, credible, and consistent testimony that respondent touched her arm and leg and asked to touch her breasts, and such physical acts and statements were unwanted. She had no motive to lie about the incident, particularly against a coworker she had only worked with for two months. The complainant also credibly testified that the incident left her feeling uncomfortable, shocked, and scared for her job because her position was seasonal, while respondent’s was permanent. Her testimony was corroborated by her incident report, contemporaneously filed three days after the incident. *See Transit Auth. v. Victor*, OATH Index No. 799/11 at 4 (Mar. 3, 2011), *aff’d*, NYC Civ. Serv. Comm’n Item No. CD-11-52-A (Aug. 9, 2011) (“This tribunal has found that contemporaneous statements evince reliability.”). It was further corroborated by her supervisor, Garcia, who credibly testified regarding the complainant’s

emotional state during their telephone call when she reported the incident to him, and Garcia's own incident report contemporaneously filed on the same day as the incident. The complainant's testimony that the incident occurred in the office at lunchtime was corroborated by respondent's admission that he arrived at work around noon that day and started his workday in the office before going out to the field.

Respondent's denial of the allegations was uncorroborated and not credible. Given petitioner's corroborating evidence, I credited the complainant's testimony over his. *See Menzies*, OATH 678/98 at 2 (factors to be considered in making credibility assessments include the consistency of a witness's testimony and supporting or corroborating evidence). I also did not find it incredible that the complainant would ask respondent to call another employee to pick her up, given that respondent was a permanent supervisor, unlike the complainant who was merely seasonal, and she explained that the employee had a history of not answering her calls. It is worth noting that respondent did not call Joshua to corroborate his version of events.

In sum, the credible evidence established that respondent sexually harassed the complainant on July 5, 2025, and engaged in conduct that is prejudicial to good order and discipline in the workplace. *See, e.g., Dep't of Education v. Vereen*, OATH Index No. 1643/24 at 12 (May 31, 2024), *adopted*, Chancellor Dec. (July 2, 2024) (finding that a custodian sexually harassed three women through "interactions . . . that were unwelcome, offensive, and sexual in nature," including sexual comments and gestures and a sexually explicit photograph); *Health & Hospitals Corp. (Segundo Belvis Diagnostic & Treatment Ctr.) v. Rivera*, OATH Index No. 414/14 at 2-5 (Dec. 4, 2013) (finding that inappropriate and sexually demeaning comments towards a hospital volunteer about her body constituted sexual harassment); *Dep't of Parks and Recreation v. Gowdy*, OATH Index No. 240/13 at 2-3 (Oct. 19, 2012) (finding that a park worker engaged in forcible touching and sexual abuse and such conduct was disruptive and prejudicial to good order and discipline in the workplace); *Health & Hospitals Corp. (Elmhurst Hospital Ctr.) v. Polepalle*, OATH Index No. 142/13 at 11 (Nov. 20, 2012) (finding that an employee sexually harassed two co-workers by grabbing one from behind and pressing himself against her and by kissing the other three times); *Dep't of Housing Preservation & Development v. Brannon*, OATH Index No. 1723/08 at 4 (May 23, 2008), *aff'd*, NYC Civ. Serv. Comm'n Item No. CD-09-09 SA (Mar.

18, 2009) (finding that an employee engaged in unprofessional and improper conduct when he approached another attorney outside a courtroom, placed his hand on her arm, and asked her for a kiss).

Findings and Conclusions

Petitioner proved that respondent sexually harassed a coworker on July 5, 2025.

Recommendation

Upon making these findings, I obtained and reviewed respondent's personnel abstract. In May 2007, the Department hired respondent as a City Park Worker. In May 2012, respondent was permanently appointed to an Associate Park Service Worker. In April 2018, he was permanently appointed to a Park Supervisor.

Respondent has been formally disciplined on three occasions. In 2014, he received a 60-day suspension in connection with a failed drug test. In 2017, he received a 60-day suspension and was demoted from a seasonal Park Supervisor 1 position to an Associate Park Service Worker in connection with a failed drug test. In 2025, he forfeited four days of annual leave in connection with a falsification of records charge. In his 2022 performance evaluation, respondent was rated "good" in most categories but "conditional" for the tasks "[u]tilize all available resources and equipment to improve services provided to the public," "[r]eport to work according to assigned schedule," and "[a]dhere to Agency time and leave guidelines." In his 2024 and 2025 performance evaluations, respondent was rated as "good" or "very good" in all categories. Petitioner does not have any evaluations on file for the years 2020, 2021, or 2023.

Petitioner has requested that respondent's employment be terminated, arguing that sexual harassment is "serious misconduct, warranting severe punishment" (Tr. 39). Furthermore, respondent supervises staff members at "isolated locations throughout the city," and "[a]s a result of his behavior, the Department has lost trust in [respondent]" (*Id.*).

Respondent's behavior was undoubtedly troubling and disruptive. As a supervisor, he is responsible for overseeing employees and volunteers and interacts routinely with the public in the City's parks. His conduct caused the complainant not only to feel uncomfortable and scared but also to fear for her job because although respondent did not supervise the complainant, and

Garcia supervised both, there were still power differentials in their respective positions since respondent was a permanently appointed supervisor and the complainant was not.

However, without minimizing the seriousness of the misconduct, respondent has been found to have committed one act of sexual harassment and his prior discipline, albeit significant, was unrelated to such conduct. Furthermore, he and the complainant did not have a supervisor/subordinate relationship, as they were both supervised by Garcia, and the complainant described respondent as a coworker. Penalties short of termination for sexual harassment have been recommended for employees who have committed an isolated act of harassment or where the conduct is less egregious or pervasive. *See New York County District Attorney's Office v. Singh*, OATH Index No. 2456/24 at 20-22 (July 31, 2025) (45-day suspension recommended for custodian who engaged in inappropriate conversations and behaviors toward two female coworkers); *Rivera*, OATH 414/14 at 9-11 (30-day suspension for employee who sexually harassed a hospital volunteer on two occasions with inappropriate sexual comments); *Brannon*, OATH 1723/08 at 5-6 (30-day suspension for a single instance of sexual harassment where attorney placed his hand on another attorney's arm and asked for a kiss); *Dep't of Correction v. Skeete*, OATH Index No. 254/04 at 12-13 (June 3, 2004), *aff'd*, NYC Civ. Serv. Comm'n Item No. CD-05-66-SA (Sept. 14, 2005) (45-day suspension for a single instance of sexual harassment by correction officer who rubbed his genitals against a female officer's buttocks); *Dep't of Correction v. Lee*, OATH Index No. 1264/96 at 5-6 (Aug. 8, 1996), *aff'd*, NYC Civ. Serv. Comm'n Item No. 97-80-SA (Sept. 11, 1997) (30-day suspension for a single instance of sexual harassment by correction officer who made an inappropriate, sexually suggestive remark and gesture to female correction officer).

In contrast, this tribunal has recommended a penalty of termination in cases where the harassment is pervasive or especially egregious. *See, e.g., Dep't of Social Services (Human Resources Admin.) v. Holmes*, OATH Index No. 1979/25 at 14-16 (Nov. 12, 2025), *adopted*, Comm'r Dec. (Dec. 8, 2025), *aff'd*, NYC Civ. Serv. Comm'n Index No. 2025-0912 (Apr. 6, 2026) (termination of employment for employee who engaged in a pattern of sexual harassment toward a coworker for about two years); *Vereen*, OATH 1643/24 at 14-16 (termination of employment for employee engaged in sexual harassment for about a year, involving sexual

gestures, sexual comments and a sexually explicit photograph); *Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth. v. Roberson*, OATH Index No. 753/94 at 23-27 (Mar. 13, 1995), *adopted*, Comm'r. Dec. (Mar. 20, 1995), *aff'd*, 232 A.D.2d 200 (1st Dep't 1996) (termination for employee who engaged in repeated, persistent sexual propositions to coworker over almost a year, continuing even after coworker told employee to leave her alone; penalty of dismissal from employment found "not so disproportionate as to shock one's sense of fairness"); *Dep't of Correction v. Rupnarine*, OATH Index No. 522/89 (July 21, 1989), *aff'd*, 169 A.D.2d 545 (1st Dep't 1991), *appeal denied*, 77 N.Y.2d 809 (1991) (termination for officer for one egregious act of sexual harassment, involving masturbation in front of colleague). This has not been shown to be the case here and termination of respondent's employment is therefore not warranted.

Accordingly, considering the seriousness of respondent's conduct and his prior disciplinary history, I recommend that respondent be suspended without pay for 60 days.

Christine Stecura
Administrative Law Judge

June 12, 2026

Submitted To:

Tricia Shimamura
Commissioner

Appearances:

Saba Jote, Esq.
Attorney for Petitioner

Jill Mendelberg, Esq.
Attorney for Respondent



Tricia Shimamura
Commissioner

City of New York
Parks & Recreation

The Arsenal
Central Park
New York, NY 10065
nyc.gov/parks

June 29, 2026

Leroy Dunnell
[REDACTED]

Dear Mr. Dunnell:

After a complete review of the Report and Recommendation of the administrative law judge duly designated to conduct a disciplinary hearing on the charges and specifications, dated June 12, 2026, I find you guilty as reflected in the report and recommendation, a copy of which is enclosed.

The sanction imposed upon you is:

A 60-Day Suspension Without Pay

Under the provisions of section 76 of the New York Civil Service Law, you are entitled to appeal from this determination by application either to the New York City Civil Service Commission or the New York Supreme Court, in accordance with the provisions of Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. If you elect to appeal to the Commission, such appeal must be filed in writing within twenty (20) days of receipt of this determination. A decision of the Commission is final and conclusive.

Thank you,
[REDACTED]

Tricia Shimamura

Encl.

cc: Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings (w/out enclosure)
Jackie Langsam, Queens Borough Commissioner (w/out enclosure)
Phil Sparacio, Queens Deputy Chief of Operations (w/out enclosure)
Matthew Symons, Queens Deputy Chief of Operations (w/out enclosure)
Elizabeth Ripatola, Queens Deputy Chief of Operations (w/out enclosure)
Fabio Arceyut, Queens Chief of Administrative Services (w/out enclosure)
Aretha Singh, Chief of Personnel
Jose Diaz, Director of Payroll & Timekeeping
Tarice Harris, Director of Benefits
Parks Advocate (2)